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THE EFFICACY AND IMPACT OF INTERIM 
MEASURES: UKRAINE’S INTER-STATE 
APPLICATION AGAINST RUSSIA 
JULIA KOCH* 
Abstract: In 2013, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych rejected an interna-
tional agreement that had been formulated to strengthen political and economic 
ties between Ukraine and the European Union. A sharp divide between pro-
Western and pro-Russian groups arose, and a pattern of protests and violence 
broke out in Kiev, spreading to the east and resulting in—among other things—
the annexation of Crimea by Russia. The apparent role of the Russian govern-
ment in this conflict led Ukraine to file an inter-state application against Russia 
in the European Court of Human Rights. Ukraine alleged that Russia was respon-
sible for the violation of Ukrainian nationals’ rights under the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The court granted 
Ukraine’s simultaneous request for interim measures, forbidding either Ukraine 
or Russia from using military action or from engaging in conduct of any kind that 
would violate Ukrainian nationals’ Convention rights. Recent events suggest that 
both states have violated the order, making the interim measures seemingly inef-
fective. The inter-state application and interim measures are not, however, value-
less as they have helped to encourage a more efficient, peaceful resolution. 
INTRODUCTION 
Violence erupted across the country after Ukrainian President Viktor 
Yanukovych abandoned a monumental economic and political association 
agreement with the European Union (EU) in November 2013.1 Ethnic and cul-
tural divisions that had existed in Ukraine for centuries gave way to hostility as 
                                                                                                                           
 * Julia Koch is the Executive Note Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative 
Law Review. 
 1 See Will Englund & Kathy Lally, Ukraine, Under Pressure from Russia, Puts Brakes on E.U. 
Deal, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ukraine-under-
pressure-from-russia-puts-brakes-on-eu-deal/2013/11/21/46c50796-52c9-11e3-9ee6-2580086d8254_
story.html [http://perma.cc/8NYL-5ELR]; Ian Traynor & Shaun Walker, Ukraine Violence: Dozens 
Killed as Protesters Clash with Armed Police, GUARDIAN (Feb. 20, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/20/ukraine-protesters-force-riot-police-independence-square-
kiev-battle-control [http://perma.cc/69HZ-4U5X]; Ukraine Protests After Yanukovych EU Deal Rejec-
tion, BBC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25162563 [http://perma.
cc/2HJV-CWPG]. 
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pro-Western protestors violently challenged Yanukovych’s decision.2 Armed 
pro-Russian groups countered this movement and took over a collection of 
government buildings throughout eastern Ukraine.3 Since the beginning of the 
fighting, the civilian death toll and human rights abuses have risen consistent-
ly.4 The annexation of Crimea by Russia in early 2014 not only challenged the 
state sovereignty of Ukraine but also gave way to additional human rights vio-
lations in the region.5 In the face of continued violence and Russian influence, 
Ukraine filed an inter-state application against Russia seeking relief before the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and alleging, among other things, 
the violation of Ukrainian nationals’ right to life and right to freedom from tor-
ture or inhuman and degrading treatment.6 The court granted Ukraine’s simul-
                                                                                                                           
 2 See Ukraine History: Independent Ukraine, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/612921/Ukraine/314882/The-Maidan-protest-movement [http://perma.cc/BV56-
9EVN] (last updated Feb. 11, 2015); Ukraine, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/612921/Ukraine [http://perma.cc/H7TM-YAB7] (last updated Feb. 11, 2015); 
Ukraine History: Prehistory, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/
612921/Ukraine/275902/Cultural-institutions#toc30061 [http://perma.cc/JW65-QNUC] (last updated 
Feb. 11, 2015). 
 3 See Roland Oliphant, Ukraine Crisis: Russian Flag Raised in Crimea as Gunmen Storm Par-
liament, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 27, 2014, 7:25 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/
ukraine/10664381/Ukraine-crisis-Russian-flag-raised-in-Crimea-as-gunmen-storm-parliament.html 
[http://perma.cc/64Z5-HQC3]; Ukraine History: Independent Ukraine, supra note 2. 
 4 See OFFICE OF THE UN HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS SIT-
UATION IN UKRAINE, ¶ 4 (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/OHCHR_
sixth_report_on_Ukraine.pdf [http://perma.cc/PUQ9-KGDS] [hereinafter SEPTEMBER REPORT]; OF-
FICE OF THE UN HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN 
UKRAINE, 14 (May 15, 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/HRMMUReport
15May2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/F2FK-9L5J] [hereinafter MAY REPORT]; UN Chief ‘Gravely Con-
cerned’ as Civilian Death Toll from Ukraine Conflict Continues to Rise, UN NEWS CENTRE (Feb. 5, 
2015), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50001#.VlJqpPmrTIW [http://perma.cc/
E6ZA-T9AB]  [hereinafter UN Chief ‘Gravely Concerned’]. 
 5 See MAY REPORT, supra note 4, at 4, 34; Ukraine History: Independent Ukraine, supra note 2. 
 6 See Press Release, Eur. Court of Human Rights, European Court of Human Rights Deals with 
Cases Concerning Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (Nov. 25, 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
webservices/content/pdf/003-4945099-6056223 [http://perma.cc/Y9GC-BQ3K] [hereinafter Novem-
ber Press Release]; Press Release, Eur. Court of Human Rights, Interim Measure Granted in Inter-
State Case Brought by Ukraine Against Russia, (Mar. 13, 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng-
press/pages/search.aspx?i=003-4699472-5703982 [http://perma.cc/W7KF-UKFW] [hereinafter March 
Press Release]. In addition to this application, Ukraine v. Russia (App. No. 20958/14), Ukraine also 
filed three additional inter-state applications against Russia: Ukraine v. Russia II (App. No. 
43800/14), which was lodged in June 2014 and asserts claims regarding the abduction of children in 
eastern Ukraine; Ukraine v. Russia III (App. No. 49537/14), which alleges that Russia mistreated and 
deprived a Ukrainian national of his liberty, although it was later struck from the court’s docket and 
replaced by an individual application against Russia; and Ukraine v. Russia IV (App. No. 42410/15), 
which was lodged in August 2015 and concerns human rights abuses that occurred during the fighting 
of September 2014. Press Release, Eur. Court of Human Rights, Russia Press Country Profile 14 (Oct. 
15, 2015), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/CP_Russia_ENG.pdf [http://perma.cc/9E32-D7YV]. 
More than 1400 individual applications have been filed against Russia in connection with the ongoing 
conflict in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Id. at 14–15. 
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taneous request for interim measures due to the dangerous and volatile situa-
tion in the region; however, the court has yet to make an admissibility deter-
mination or to rule on the merits.7 Nevertheless, Ukraine v. Russia is unique 
because of the procedure surrounding inter-state applications, the nature of 
ECtHR interim measures, and the implications the case may have on global 
politics.8 
Part I of this Note provides a background on Ukrainian history and details 
the recent conflict sparked by the failed EU agreement. It also describes the pro-
cedure and nature of Ukraine’s inter-state application and the ECtHR’s interim 
measures. Part II outlines the ECtHR’s case law on inter-state applications, inter-
im measures, and extraterritorial jurisdiction. Finally, Part III argues that the 
court’s interim measures have not been effective, as both Ukraine and Russia 
have failed to comply with the court’s order. That is not to say, however, that the 
interim measures are without value. Rather, the court’s order can still contribute 
to the overall discourse and conflict resolution process in international law. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Ukrainian History 
1. From the Middle Ages to the Twentieth Century 
Until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine was primarily 
controlled by outsiders, which contributed to the broad mix and variation in the 
Ukrainian culture that has developed over centuries.9 Beginning in the mid-
                                                                                                                           
 7 See EUR. COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, PRACTICAL GUIDE ON ADMISSIBILITY CRITERIA 9 (2014), 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf [http://perma.cc/QYX9-6FV7] 
[hereinafter ADMISSIBILITY CRITERIA]; November Press Release, supra note 6, at 1. The court grant-
ed Russia an extension of time to submit its “observations on the admissibility” of Ukraine’s applica-
tion, which was due on December 31, 2015. Press Release, Eur. Court of Human Rights, European 
Court of Human Rights Communicates to Russia New Inter-State Case Concerning Events in Crimea 
and Eastern Ukraine 1 (Oct. 1, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf?library=
ECHR&id=003-5187816-6420666&filename=ECHR%20communicates%20new%20inter-State%
20case%20concerning%20events%20in%20Crimea%20and%20Eastern%20Ukraine.pdf [http://
perma.cc/G59G-PH4B]. An admissibility hearing will take place if one or more of the contracting 
parties requests a hearing, and is often accompanied by additional briefing and oral argument. EUR. 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, RULES OF COURT, R. 51 at 27, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Rules_Court_ENG.pdf [http://perma.cc/5EWY-BQYS]. There are procedural, jurisdictional, and 
merit-based grounds for which the court can find an application inadmissible. See ADMISSIBILITY 
CRITERIA, supra, at 22, 41, 82. 
 8 See Ukraine’s Sharp Divisions, BBC NEWS (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-26387353 [http://perma.cc/N5Z5-5SDU]; Philip Leach, Ukraine, Russia and Crimea in the 
European Court of Human Rights, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/ukraine-
russia-and-crimea-in-the-european-court-of-human-rights/ [http://perma.cc/M2AS-JA32]. 
 9 See Russia, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/513251/Russia 
[http://perma.cc/39J2-TT8Y] (last updated Mar. 19, 2015); Ukraine History: Lithuanian and Polish 
Rule, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/612921/Ukraine/30063/
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fourteenth century and lasting for three hundred years, portions of Ukraine 
were ruled by the Tartar Golden Horde while others were concurrently ruled by 
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and still others by the Kingdom of Poland.10 In 
the mid-seventeenth century, a large tract of Ukraine experienced self-
governance and independence as the result of a Cossack revolt; it was short-
lived, however, and portions of the territory were partitioned to other powerful 
states in the region.11 Following an additional sequence of annexations in the 
late-eighteenth century, much of present-day Ukraine came under the control 
of the Russian Empire while a fraction of its western land was partitioned by 
the Habsburg Empire.12 By the end of the First World War, Ukraine became a 
part of the Soviet Union, where it remained until 1991.13 
Following World War II, Ukrainians experienced a purge of foreign and 
non-Soviet ideas under the tight and repressive control of Joseph Stalin.14 The 
repression of outside influence—for example, the prohibition of any publica-
tions in languages other than Russian—was known as Russification, and it was 
historically used to unify the various Russian territories.15 Throughout the next 
half-century, Ukrainians were subject to a constant ebb and flow of Russifica-
tion as Ukrainian political or cultural leaders would gain power and influence 
under a particular regime, only to have the advances of Ukrainian national de-
velopment squashed during the next era.16 For example, in the 1950s, Ukraini-
                                                                                                                           
Lithuanian-and-Polish-rule [http://perma.cc/MJ6A-LC5L] (last updated Feb. 11, 2015); Ukraine, 
supra note 2. 
 10 Ukraine History: Lithuanian and Polish Rule, supra note 9. 
 11 See PAUL KUBICEK, HISTORY OF UKRAINE 39–40 (2008); PAUL R. MAGOCSI, THE HISTORY 
OF UKRAINE: THE LAND AND ITS PEOPLES 242 (2d ed. 2010). 
 12 See Ukraine History: The Cossacks, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EB
checked/topic/612921/Ukraine/30070/Right-Bank-and-western-Ukraine-until-the-Partitions-of-Poland 
[http://perma.cc/TB4Y-UT3H] (last updated Feb. 11, 2015). 
 13 Ukraine History: Ukraine in the Interwar Period, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://www.
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/612921/Ukraine/30077/Ukraine-in-the-interwar-period [http://
perma.cc/FV9J-F53G] (last updated Feb. 11, 2015). Many of the small portions of present-day 
Ukraine that were not part of the Soviet Union in 1919 were later annexed by the Soviets in the 1939 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, in which the Soviet Union acquired a northwestern portion of Ukraine from 
Poland. Id. It also acquired a southwestern portion of Ukraine from Romania in a 1940 annexation. Id. 
 14 See MAGOCSI, supra note 11, at 14. 
 15 See KUBICEK, supra note 11, at 50; Ukraine History: Lithuanian and Polish Rule, supra note 9. 
 16 See Ukraine History: Soviet Ukraine in the Postwar Period, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://
www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/612921/Ukraine/30085/The-period-of-Khrushchev [http://
perma.cc/NFU2-MBCK] (last updated Feb. 11, 2015); Ukraine History: World War II and Its After-
math, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/612921/Ukraine/275916/
The-Nazi-occupation-of-Soviet-Ukraine [http://perma.cc/Y45B-WQ68] (last updated Feb. 11, 2015). 
As part of this ebb and flow, Stalin used harsh tactics to suppress the development of Ukrainian na-
tionality, sending hundreds of thousands of disloyal nationalists to concentration camps in Siberia. See 
Ukraine History: Soviet Ukraine in the Postwar Period, supra. Conversely, the mid-to-late-1980s 
marked mass mobilization and public demonstrations, which were successfully aimed at asserting the 
Ukrainian language, culture, and tradition. Id.; Ukraine History: World War II and Its Aftermath, supra. 
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an culture, literature, and economics flourished for a period of time under Ni-
kita Khrushchev.17 Only a few years later, however, Ukrainians found an in-
crease in political repression while Ukrainian-language education and publica-
tions were restricted.18 It was during this volatile period that the Soviets trans-
ferred Crimea to Ukraine in celebration of the 300th anniversary of their reuni-
fication.19 
Despite resistance from Moscow, Ukraine began to break free from the 
Soviet government in the early 1990s when it held its first competitive parlia-
mentary elections and declared its sovereignty.20 As the Soviet Union began to 
unravel, Ukraine declared its full independence in August 1991.21 
2. An Independent Ukraine 
Although Ukraine was successful in building its international relation-
ships, infrastructure, and military, it—like other former Soviet states—faced 
several key challenges after gaining independence, including the achievement 
of economic prosperity and maintenance of amicable relations with Russia.22 
Immediately after Ukrainian independence in 1991, tensions flared between 
Russia and Ukraine over Crimea, where ethnic Russians made up a majority of 
the population.23 Crimea became an autonomous Ukrainian republic in 1991, 
shortly before a slight majority of Crimeans, somewhat unexpectedly, voted to 
support the Ukrainian referendum for independence.24 Separatist movements in 
the region, however, soon developed with Russian support.25 The separatist 
                                                                                                                           
It was during this time that Ukrainian was formally denoted as the official language of the Ukrainian 
Republic. Ukraine History: Soviet Ukraine in the Postwar Period, supra. 
 17 Ukraine History: Soviet Ukraine in the Postwar Period, supra note 16. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Mark Kramer, Why Did Russia Give Away Crimea Sixty Years Ago? WILSON CENTER, http://
www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/why-did-russia-give-away-crimea-sixty-years-ago [http://perma.cc/
ZG2R-J6VT] (last visited Jan. 5, 2016). Even today, what prompted Russia to gift Crimea to Ukraine 
is not clear in part because there was little explanation or documentation surrounding this 1954 deci-
sion. Id. It may be that Khrushchev, then First Secretary of the Communist Party, was seeking to build 
strength and power. Id. Gifting Crimea to Ukraine would help to cement Soviet power in Ukraine—
particularly after a bloody Ukrainian civil war in the 1940s. Id. This gift—described by the Soviet gov-
ernment as reflecting the “unity of Russians and Ukrainians” and a “great and indissoluble friendship”—
may also have been strategic because, by adding Crimea and its large Russian population to Ukrainian 
territory, Russian presence and identity increased in the region as did support for the Soviet regime. Id.; 
see MAGOCSI, supra note 11, at 22. 
 20 See MAGOCSI, supra note 11, at 724; Ukraine History: Soviet Ukraine in the Postwar Period, 
supra note 16. 
 21 See MAGOCSI, supra note 11, at 724. 
 22 See Ukraine History: Independent Ukraine, supra note 2; Ukraine History: Soviet Ukraine in 
the Postwar Period, supra note 16. 
 23 Ukraine History: Independent Ukraine, supra note 2. 
 24 MAGOCSI, supra note 11, at 724; Ukraine History: Independent Ukraine, supra note 2. 
 25 Ukraine History: Independent Ukraine, supra note 2. 
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movements ultimately were crushed in the mid-1990s when the Ukrainian 
government instituted direct political control over Crimea—although relations 
between Ukraine and Russia continued to flare periodically.26 
In today’s Ukraine, approximately 78% of the population is comprised of 
ethnic Ukrainians while roughly 17% identify as Russian and make up the 
largest ethnic minority.27 Similarly, about 67% of the population speaks 
Ukrainian, the state’s official language, and approximately 24% speaks Rus-
sian, which is considered a regional language.28 A majority of the native Rus-
sians and Russian speakers live in the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine, 
bordering Russia and the Black Sea.29 The 2010 presidential election between 
Yanukovych—who was supported by Russian President Vladimir Putin—and 
Yulia Tymoshenko—who was backed by Western states—demonstrated the 
geopolitical and cultural divide in Ukraine: the oblasts that voted for Yanu-
kovych were those with the highest Russian populations in the east and south 
of Ukraine, and those oblasts that voted for Tymoshenko were primarily com-
prised of native Ukrainian speakers, located in central and western Ukraine.30 
Yanukovych won the election, taking approximately 49% of the votes.31 
                                                                                                                           
 26 Id.; see Kathy Lally, Russian Forces in Ukraine: What Does the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea 
Look Like? WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russia-
decides-to-send-troops-into-crimea-what-does-the-black-sea-fleet-look-like/2014/03/01/38cf005c-
a160-11e3-b8d8-94577ff66b28_story.html [http://perma.cc/KPM8-5Y63]; Daniel Sneider, Russia, 
Ukraine Agree to Split Black Sea Fleet, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 18, 1993), http://www.
csmonitor.com/1993/0618/18062.html/%28page%29/2 [http://perma.cc/AD7Y-2BTC]. Which state 
was to control the former Soviet Black Sea navy fleet stationed in Crimea, for example, was hotly 
contested. Ukraine History: Independent Ukraine, supra note 2. It was resolved over a period of ap-
proximately ten years by splitting the fleet between the two states; Ukraine ultimately leased the base, 
which was located in Sevastopol, to Russia. See id. Russia also always had considered Ukrainians to 
be effectively Russian, thus the sudden independence of Ukraine proved more difficult for Russia to 
accept than the independence of other former Soviet states. See id. Ukraine, in turn, became hyper-
aware of any encroachment on its sovereignty by Russia—particularly in these early years of inde-
pendence. See id. 
 27 The World Factbook: Ukraine, CIA (June 24, 2014), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/up.html [https://perma.cc/W6PB-6AN9]. 
 28 Id. Pursuant to Ukrainian law, a regional language is one that is spoken by at least 10% of the 
population and is permitted to be used in schools, courts, and additional government organizations. 
Id.; Ukraine History: Independent Ukraine, supra note 2. 
 29 Ukraine’s Sharp Divisions, supra note 8. 
 30 See id. An oblast is a type of administrative or political division in former Soviet states, like a 
state or province. Oblast, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/oblast [http://perma.cc/KZV7-QY23] (last visited Jan. 5, 2016); see Ralph S. Clem, Why 
Eastern Ukraine Is an Integral Part of Ukraine, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.washington
post.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/07/why-eastern-ukraine-is-an-integral-part-of-ukraine/ 
[http://perma.cc/DZ6N-8HVU]. 
 31 Viktory for the Blue Camp, ECONOMIST (Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/
15501625 [http://perma.cc/UC7Y-PAGC]. 
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B. Protests, Riots, and Secession in 2013 and 2014 
1. Protests and Riots in Kiev 
Yanukovych’s pro-Russian leanings were reflected in his presidency, dur-
ing which he abandoned Ukraine’s goal of joining the North American Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and cut a lucrative deal to extend Russia’s lease of the 
Crimean navy base.32 His strongest move, however, came on November 21, 
2013, when he announced that the country would not be moving forward with 
an association agreement between Ukraine and the European Union.33 The as-
sociation agreement functioned as a beneficial trade pact that also would polit-
ically align Ukraine with the EU.34 It was years in the making and part of a 
monumental development policy by the EU to strengthen its ties with the for-
mer Soviet states.35 Yanukovych’s cabinet suspended preparations to sign the 
agreement eight days before a signature was expected.36 The Parliament fol-
lowed Yanukovych’s lead when it systematically rejected six additional pieces 
of legislation that were required to meet the terms of the EU agreement.37 
Although Putin denied playing a role in Yanukovych’s decision to with-
draw from the EU agreement, Yanukovych and Putin met several times in the 
months leading up to the decision—and at least once in secret—amidst Rus-
sian threats of economic sanctions against Ukraine.38 In the end, the economic 
threats proved effective, and Yanukovych announced that Ukraine would not 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See Ukraine’s Parliament Votes to Abandon NATO Ambitions, BBC NEWS (June 3, 2010, 
10:49 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/10229626 [http://perma.cc/STQ2-C7V5]; Ukraine History: 
Independent Ukraine, supra note 2. 
 33 Why Is Ukraine in Turmoil?, BBC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2014, 1:34 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-europe-25182823 [http://perma.cc/B3U8-VVGU]; Ukraine History: Independent Ukraine, 
supra note 2. 
 34 Ian Traynor & Oksana Grytesenko, Ukraine Suspends Talks on EU Trade Pact as Putin Wins 
Tug of War, GUARDIAN (Nov. 21, 2013, 11:31 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
nov/21/ukraine-suspends-preparations-eu-trade-pact [http://perma.cc/CY2U-L5M2]; Ukraine History: 
Independent Ukraine, supra note 2. 
 35 Traynor & Grytesenko, supra note 34. 
 36 Id.; Why Is Ukraine in Turmoil?, supra note 33; Englund & Lally, supra note 1. 
 37 Daryna Krasnolutska & Kateryna Choursina, Ukraine Parliament Fails to Adopt Tymoshenko 
Law for EU Pact, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Nov. 21, 2013, 5:29 AM) http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2013-11-21/ukrainian-parliament-fails-to-adopt-tymoshenko-law-for-eu-accord [http://
perma.cc/ZY6S-UPYQ]; Traynor & Grytesenko, supra note 34. 
 38 Richard Balmforth, Ukraine Leader Ignores Putin Warning on EU Path, REUTERS (Aug. 24, 
2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/24/us-ukraine-russia-yanukovich-idUSBRE97N05
P20130824 [http://perma.cc/6XHH-J67D]; Putin’s Gambit: How the EU Lost Ukraine, SPIEGEL 
ONLINE (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/how-the-eu-lost-to-russia-in-
negotiations-over-ukraine-trade-deal-a-935476.html [http://perma.cc/QC9Q-688N]; Traynor & 
Grytesenko, supra note 34. Among these threatened sanctions were detailed and painstaking customs 
checks on imports at the Ukraine-Russia border. Balmforth, supra. This threat to Ukrainian trade with 
Russia and other Eurasian states was particularly concerning because more than 60% of Ukraine’s ex-
ports involved these Eurasian states. Id. 
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move forward with the EU but would instead consider joining a “Moscow-lead 
customs union.”39 Yanukovych defended his decision by saying that Ukraine 
“could not afford to sacrifice” its trade with Russia.40 
Rejection of the EU agreement led immediately to protests in Kiev and 
other cities throughout central and western Ukraine.41 More than 10,000 pro-
testers demanded either that Yanukovych reverse his decision and Parliament 
pass the six required pieces of legislation or that Yanukovych be removed from 
office.42 The protests continued into December with only occasional violence 
breaking out and then into January, when the protests turned into vicious ri-
ots.43 In the early months of 2014, dozens of anti-government protesters were 
killed by state police as the protesters stormed government buildings in Kiev 
and elsewhere in western Ukraine.44 Before the end of February, the EU im-
posed sanctions against Yanukovych’s government for failure to control the 
growing violence, constitutional measures dramatically reduced the president’s 
powers, Yanukovych fled the capital prior to an impeachment vote, and the 
interim Parliament issued a warrant against Yanukovych for the mass murder 
of the protesters.45 
2. Crimean Secession 
The pro-Western sentiment in Kiev was countered by growing pro-
Russian protests in eastern Ukraine and, in particular, Crimea.46 The protests 
escalated quickly to the point where masked gunmen occupied the Crimean 
parliament building in the capital, Simferopol, and raised a Russian flag.47 
Immediately thereafter, a pro-Russian prime minister was installed in Crimea, 
communication wires were severed between Crimea and the rest of Ukraine, 
and Russia began moving its own troops into the region.48 Putin defended this 
                                                                                                                           
 39 Oksana Grystenko, Ukrainian Protesters Flood Kiev After President Pulls out of EU Deal, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 24, 2013, 10:44 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/24/ukraine-
protesters-yanukovych-aborts-eu-deal-russia [http://perma.cc/5MT5-PD3V]; see Putin’s Gambit: How 
the EU Lost Ukraine, supra note 38; Ukraine History: Independent Ukraine, supra note 2. 
 40 Ukraine Protests After Yanukovych EU Deal Rejection, supra note 1. 
 41 See id. 
 42 Grystenko, supra note 39. 
 43 Ukraine History: Independent Ukraine, supra note 2. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id.; see also Paul Sonne, Ukraine Issues Arrest Warrant for Ousted President Yanukovych, 
WALL STREET J. (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230461040457
9402401580476592 [http://perma.cc/93AA-XC2E]; Ukraine Arrest Warrant for Fugitive Victor 
Yanukovych, BBC News (Feb. 24, 2014, 7:55 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
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 46 See Oliphant, supra note 3. 
 47 See id.; Ukraine Crisis: Timeline, BBC NEWS (Nov. 13, 2014, 3:16 PM), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-middle-east-26248275 [http://perma.cc/DSQ3-SASD]; Ukraine History: Independent 
Ukraine, supra note 2. 
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last maneuver as necessary to protect the Russian interests, military assets, and 
citizens living in Crimea.49 
On March 6, 2014, the Crimean parliament voted to secede from Ukraine 
and scheduled a public referendum for March 16 to confirm this vote.50 The 
results of the referendum showed that 97% of voters supported Crimean seces-
sion, although the interim government in Kiev refused to recognize the vote 
and cited various irregularities, including the presence of armed men at polling 
stations.51 Days later, Putin signed a treaty annexing Crimea, which was fol-
lowed by the prompt Russian occupation of Crimean military bases and the 
ratification of the treaty to formally bring Crimea into the Russian Federa-
tion.52 Ukraine and Western states challenged this secession and subsequent 
military occupation as a blatant violation of Ukraine’s state sovereignty.53 
Pro-Russian separatists continued to take over government buildings 
throughout eastern Ukraine, allegedly with the aid of Russian weapons and 
ammunition.54 Tensions continued to build when NATO reported that, as of 
early April, an estimated 40,000 Russian troops were amassing in Russia, just 
across the Ukrainian border.55 Over the coming months, violent skirmishes 
continued while negotiation talks between Ukraine, Russia, the EU, and the 
United States failed to produce a ceasefire.56 As fighting continued, the sepa-
                                                                                                                           
 49 Id.; see Ukraine Crisis: Timeline, supra note 47. 
 50 Ukraine History: Independent Ukraine, supra note 2. 
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Ukraine, Join Russia, WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2014/03/
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Speech, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russias-putin-prepares-
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set-by-ukraine-separatists-wins-russias-support.html [http://perma.cc/LLQ3-Q5E3]; Morello, Consta-
ble & Faiola, supra note 51. 
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TREATY ORG. (last updated Nov. 26, 2014, 6:14 PM), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_
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Imagery]; Ukraine History: Independent Ukraine, supra note 2. These takeovers, like those in Crimea, 
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 56 See Ukraine History: Independent Ukraine, supra note 2. 
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ratists opened a southern front, and as of late August, NATO estimated that more 
than 1000 Russian troops were actively engaged in fighting on Ukrainian soil.57 
C. Ukraine’s Inter-State Application Against Russia 
On March 13, 2014, Ukraine filed an inter-state application against Rus-
sia in the ECtHR alleging various human rights violations.58 In doing so, 
Ukraine invoked Article 33 of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Convention), which provides that any 
“Contracting Party may refer to the Court any alleged breach of the provisions 
of the Convention . . . by another . . . Contracting Party.”59 Consequently, a 
contracting party, like Ukraine, may bring an inter-state application in an effort 
to protect the lives and health of that state’s nationals from the conduct of an-
other contracting party.60 
In its application, Ukraine complained of violations of Article 2 (the right 
to life) and Article 3 (the right to protection from torture or inhuman and de-
grading treatment) as well as several other rights protected by the Conven-
tion.61 Many of these claims arose from the killing of Ukrainian civilians that 
related to Russia’s annexation of Crimea.62 Other claims resulted from the 
pressure allegedly put on Crimeans to abandon their Ukrainian citizenship in 
favor of Russian citizenship.63 Additionally, Ukrainians who tried to protect 
their property or customs in the east were allegedly harassed and threatened.64 
Finally, journalists reporting on the events were said to have been abducted, 
attacked, and impeded from their work.65 
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 58 March Press Release, supra note 6; November Press Release, supra note 6, at 1; see Kan-
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ECHR BLOG (Mar. 24, 2014), http://echrblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/ukraine-russia-inter-state-
application.html [http://perma.cc/MD48-FCBN]. 
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 62 See id. 
 63 See id. 
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Also on March 13, under Rule 39 of the ECtHR Rules of Court, the court 
granted interim measures, which Ukraine had requested upon filing its applica-
tion.66 The interim measures, intended to prevent violations of the Convention 
while a case is pending, required that both Russia and Ukraine “refrain from 
taking any measures . . . which might entail breaches of the Convention rights 
of the civilian population, including putting their life and health at risk . . . .”67 
In particular, the court sought to protect the Ukrainian nationals’ rights under 
Articles 2 and 3, as it called upon Ukraine and Russia to abstain from taking 
any “military action[]” that might lead to further violations of the Conven-
tion.68 
Procedurally, the next hearing in Ukraine v. Russia is an admissibility 
hearing, where the court will vet Ukraine’s claims to make sure they conform 
with the court’s admissibility standards.69 The date of this hearing has not been 
identified in press releases, but the court requested that Russia submit its “ob-
servations on the admissibility” of the Ukrainian application by December 31, 
2015.70 If the court finds Ukraine’s application admissible, it will then hear the 
merits of the case.71 Additionally, documents filed with the court are available 
to the public under Rule 33, but in this early stage of the proceedings, Ukraine’s 
entire application is confidential.72 This decision, also made by the court under 
Rule 33, means that the several ECtHR press releases regarding Ukraine v. Rus-
sia are the only case documents currently available to the public.73 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Article 33: Inter-State Applications 
Article 33 of the Convention grants jurisdiction to the ECtHR over any 
application brought by one contracting party against another contracting party 
for an alleged “breach of the provisions of the Convention and the Proto-
cols[.]”74 The court only has jurisdiction over applications that are filed against 
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a contracting party.75 Both Ukraine and Russia have been parties to the Con-
vention since 1998.76 Since its formation in 1959, the court has heard fewer 
than twenty-five inter-state cases—despite having received hundreds of thou-
sands of individual applications.77 Through an inter-state application, the ap-
plicant state can challenge other contracting states’ systemic failures, broad 
violations of the Convention, or human rights abuses.78 Any challenges regard-
ing a state’s sovereignty or territorial jurisdiction, however, are not within the 
purview of the court as they alone do not raise human rights issues.79 Reme-
dies sought in inter-state applications vary based on the claims asserted by the 
applicant state; they can include, for example, the change of a domestic policy 
or legislation so as to protect from future violations of human rights.80 The 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe—an entity related to the 
court and created by the Statute of the Council of Europe—is responsible for 
conferring with the respondent state to determine how the court’s judgment 
should be executed and how to prevent similar violations in the future.81 
Cyprus v. Turkey is exemplary of the ECtHR’s ability to hold a respondent 
state in violation of the Convention, to find the respondent state in continuing 
violation of the Convention years later, and to hold the respondent state liable 
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for a substantial fine by way of just satisfaction.82 In 1974, Cyprus filed an in-
ter-state application against Turkey for human rights violations in connection 
with Cyprus’s contested independence in 1960.83 Vying for control of the is-
land, a Greek paramilitary organization carried out a short-lived coup d’état.84 
Turkey, also fighting for control of Cyprus, responded by sending 20,000 sol-
diers to northern Cyprus and declaring a Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, 
which it justified as a way to “safeguard its territorial integrity and the security 
of life and property of the Turkish community[.]”85 As a result of this fighting, 
the European Commission on Human Rights, in 1976, found that Turkey had 
violated those rights protected by Articles 2, 3, 5, and 8—among others—of 
the Convention.86 In 2001, the ECtHR ruled favorably on a subsequent 1994 
application by Cyprus that alleged continued abuses by Turkey.87 In response 
to this application, the court also granted just satisfaction for Cyprus in 2014, 
requiring Turkey to pay Cyprus €90 million for damages suffered by specific 
groups of Cypriot nationals.88 At the time, the award was not only the largest 
one in the court’s history, but also the only one granted in an inter-state appli-
cation.89 Although Article 41 of the Convention indicates that the just satisfac-
tion judgment is legally binding on Turkey, the €90 million has gone unpaid as 
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of July 2014.90 Furthermore, Turkey’s foreign minister stated that the judgment 
would not “carry any value” and that Turkey was “not thinking of paying this 
amount to a country that [it does] not recognize.”91 
Another inter-state application that has striking factual similarities to the 
one filed by Ukraine is Georgia v. Russia.92 The Georgian government lodged 
its application against Russia in August 2008 alleging that Russia had caused 
and allowed attacks against Georgian civilians and their property.93 The appli-
cation posited that Russian forces had occupied—and still held—parts of 
Georgia; as a result, Russia was exercising direct control through its armed 
forces and indirect control through its agents and de facto authorities.94 Geor-
gia argued that Russia’s engagement in Georgian territory resulted in hundreds 
of civilians killed, missing, or detained while thousands of civilians also lost 
their homes and property.95 The court held an admissibility hearing in Septem-
ber 2011 and, without ruling on the merits, found Georgia’s application admis-
sible; the court has not yet ruled on the merits of the case.96 Although Georgia 
v. Russia arises from different events, the court’s treatment of the case may 
provide insight into how it will treat the allegations arising from Russia’s ex-
traterritorial presence in Ukraine.97 
B. Rule 39: Interim Measures 
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides both individuals and states with 
the opportunity to request interim measures.98 Specifically, Rule 39 states that 
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the court “may, at the request of a party . . . indicate to the parties any interim 
measure which they consider should be adopted in the interests of the parties 
or of the proper conduct of the proceedings.”99 Interim measures often are 
granted pursuant to a motion made by the applicant and on the basis that the 
rights and principles of the Convention are at serious risk of being violated 
while the application is pending.100 Additionally, the measures are only applied 
in situations when there is an “imminent risk of irreparable harm[,]” which is a 
decision that the court makes independently from its decision on the merits of 
the application.101 
Due to its concern regarding imminent harm and the preservation of life 
and safety, the court typically grants interim measures to preserve the appli-
cant’s rights specifically under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention.102 Indeed, 
the court in Georgia v. Russia imposed interim measures that required both 
states to “comply with their engagements under the Convention, particularly 
. . . Articles 2 . . . and 3[.]” 103 This language is similar to that used by the court 
in Ukraine v. Russia, where the court required both Russia and Ukraine to “re-
frain from taking any measures, in particular military action, which might 
bring about violations of the Convention rights of the civilian population, no-
tably under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention.”104 
Although Rule 39 does not expressly indicate that interim measures are 
binding on the states, the court in Paladi v. Moldova held that contracting par-
ties have a legal obligation to comply with the measures because a failure to do 
so would prevent the court from “effectively examining the applicant’s com-
plaint and . . . hindering the effective exercise” of the applicant’s Convention 
rights.105 The court also noted in Paladi that a respondent state breaches the 
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Convention if “authorities of a Contracting State fail to take all steps which 
could reasonably have been taken in order to comply with the measure indicat-
ed by the Court.”106 
Nevertheless, the ECtHR has had a difficult time enforcing the interim 
measures that it grants.107 For example, in Labsi v. Slovakia, Slovakia was or-
dered not to expel the applicant to his home state due to a significant risk that, 
once expelled, his human rights would be violated.108 The court, in addressing 
the fact that the applicant had already been expelled contrary to the interim 
measures, found Slovakia in violation of the Convention and ordered damages 
to be paid to the applicant.109 Despite assessing damages, however, the court 
could not oblige Slovakia to take actions to undo the expulsion of the appli-
cant; therefore, it was unable to enforce its original interim measures.110 
C. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
A third aspect of the court’s case law that is critical to evaluating the effi-
cacy of the interim measures is the extent to which the acts violating the order 
can be imputed to the two contracting parties.111 Under Article 1 of the Con-
vention, the contracting parties “shall secure to everyone within their jurisdic-
tion the rights and freedoms” defined in the Convention.112 Thus, where a state 
exercises jurisdiction over an area, it may be responsible for violations of the 
Convention occurring in that area.113 As much of the violence has occurred in 
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 113 See id.; Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, App. No. 48787/99, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R., 
¶ 311 (2004), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-61886 (concluding Russia 
had jurisdiction over certain Moldovan territory, giving rise to the responsibility for Convention viola-
tions in that territory); Brief of Francoise Hampson and Noam Lubell as Amicus Curiae Third-Party 
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Ukrainian territory, the violation of Articles 2 and 3 may be imputed to 
Ukraine but also to Russia, depending on the extent of Russia’s extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.114 Whether a state has extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction is determined by the degree of control it exercises in that ar-
ea.115 Pursuant to the case law of the ECtHR, a state may have extraterritorial 
jurisdiction if that state is “involved [in] acts and omissions [through its] au-
thorities which produce effects outside of [its] own territory.”116 Extraterritorial 
jurisdiction—and often, responsibility—as a consequence of control is reflect-
ed in persuasive case law of the International Court of Justice as well.117 
1. Responsibility Through Effective Control 
Pursuant to ECtHR case law, one way to determine a state’s extraterritori-
al jurisdiction is to evaluate whether the state has effective control over the 
area.118 In Loizidou v. Turkey, the ECtHR noted that responsibility of a con-
tracting party may arise as a “consequence of military action—whether lawful 
or unlawful—[where the state exercises] effective control of an area outside its 
national territory.”119 Specifically, Loizidou dealt with the confiscation of a 
Cypriot national’s land during the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus—the 
facts of which also gave rise to the Cyprus v. Turkey inter-state application.120 
Turkey argued that the conduct occurred outside of Turkish territory and that it 
could not be responsible for conduct that occurred in territory controlled by the 
                                                                                                                           
Intervention at 3–4, Georgia v. Russia, App. No. 38263/08, Eur. Ct. H.R., http://repository.essex.
ac.uk/9689/1/hampson-lubell-georgia-russia-amicus-01062014.pdf [http://perma.cc/GH8N-FK6D] 
[hereinafter Georgia v. Russia Amicus Curiae]; Dzehtsiarou, supra note 78. 
 114 See November Press Release, supra note 6, at 1; Dzehtsiarou, supra note 78; Leach, supra 
note 8. 
 115 See Ilaşcu and Others, App. No. 48787/99, ¶¶ 382–385; Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 
15318/89, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 52 (1996), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.
aspx?i=001-58007 [http://perma.cc/AWM2-NZ8K] [hereinafter Loizidou (Merits)] (concluding that 
Turkey had jurisdiction over portions of Cyprus and was responsible for Convention violations occur-
ring in those Cypriot areas); Georgia v. Russia Amicus Curiae, supra note 113, at 3. 
 116 See Loizidou (Merits), App. No. 15318/89, ¶ 52. 
 117 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 
1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 115 (June 27) [hereinafter Military Activities in Nicaragua] (defining the context in 
which a state could be liable for actions occurring in the territory of another state, but declining to find 
the United States liable for certain actions taken by rebels in Nicaragua). 
 118 See Ilaşcu and Others, App. No. 48787/99, ¶ 314; Cyprus II, App. No. 25781/94, ¶ 77 (con-
cluding that Turkey had effective control over certain areas in Cyprus as a result of its “military and 
other support” of the local regime, the TRNC); Loizidou (Merits), App. No. 15318/89, ¶ 52. 
 119 Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), App. No. 15318/89, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 62 (1995), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57920 [http://perma.cc/6CLA-CE9Z] 
[hereinafter Loizidou (Preliminary Objections)]; see also Tinoco Arbitration (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica), 
1 R.I.A.A. 369, 381 (1923) (holding that the powers of a de facto government are not diminished, 
even when not recognized by others and not acting in conformance with a previous constitution). 
 120 Loizidou (Preliminary Objections), App. No. 15318/89, ¶ 11; see Loizidou (Merits), App. No. 
15318/89, ¶ 56. 
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Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), an organization that was “in no 
way exercising jurisdiction on behalf of Turkey[.]”121 In making its determina-
tion, the court recognized that the applicant’s loss of property was a conse-
quence of the TRNC and Turkish military occupation, and it concluded that 
“the large number of troops engaged in active duties in northern Cyprus [made 
it obvious that Turkey’s army] exercise[d] effective overall control” over the 
northern portion of the island.122 This military control imputed responsibility to 
Turkey for the TRNC’s policies and actions, and since the region fell under 
Turkish jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1, Turkey was responsible 
for protecting Cypriots’ “rights and freedoms set out in the Convention[.]”123 
This holding embodied the court’s previous observation that the “obligation to 
secure, in [an area of effective control], the rights and freedoms set out in the 
Convention derives from the fact of such control whether it be exercised di-
rectly, through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local administra-
tion.”124 
Additionally, persuasive case law from the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), specifically from Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Military Activities in Nicaragua), requires that a state must exer-
cise “effective control” over the conduct and operations of the actors before the 
actors’ conduct can be imputed to the state.125 Here, the ICJ concluded that the 
United States could not be held responsible for certain actions of contra rebels 
in Nicaragua.126 Specifically, the United States had provided the rebels with 
organization, training, equipment, and weapons.127 The contras, however, did 
not rely heavily enough on this support and their reliance, though significant, 
was nevertheless “insufficient to demonstrate their complete dependence on 
United States aid.”128 The ICJ clarified, “For this conduct [in which the United 
States provided military support to the rebels] to give rise to legal responsibil-
ity of the United States, it would in principle have to be proved that [the Unit-
ed States] had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations[.]”129 
Thus, under the case law of both the ECtHR and the ICJ, states that exer-
cise effective control over territory, even if that territory belongs to another 
state, may be held responsible for certain conduct occurring in that area.130 
                                                                                                                           
 121 Loizidou (Merits), App. No. 15318/89, ¶ 51. 
 122 Id. ¶¶ 54, 56. 
 123 Id. ¶ 56. 
 124 Loizidou (Preliminary Objections), App. No. 15318/89, ¶ 62. 
 125 See Military Activities in Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J., ¶¶ 110, 115–116. 
 126 Id. ¶¶ 115–116. 
 127 Id. ¶ 115. 
 128 Id. ¶ 110. 
 129 Id. ¶ 115. 
 130 See Military Activities in Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J., ¶ 115; Loizidou (Merits), App. No. 
15318/89, ¶ 56. 
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2. Responsibility Through Decisive Influence 
Even in instances where a state may not exercise effective control over a 
region or territory, the state’s financial, military, and political support may be 
sufficient to impute to it the conduct of others.131 A state’s “decisive influence” 
over a local government—even if that government maintains its own admin-
istration—may give rise to state responsibility.132 The ECtHR’s decisive influ-
ence standard is less rigorous than the effective control standard and may be 
sufficient to impute human rights abuses to Russia—both for purposes of eval-
uating the efficacy of the interim measures and the merits of Ukraine’s case.133 
The ECtHR applied this standard in Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and 
Russia, where Russia’s decisive influence over a separatist regime resulted in 
liability for violations of the Convention.134 Around the time of the Soviet Un-
ion’s collapse in 1991, the Republic of Moldova declared its independence 
from the Soviets while the region of Transdniestria, which had been transferred 
to Moldova years before, also declared its independence from Moldova.135 The 
Soviet army and weaponry previously stationed in Moldova was withdrawn 
from the country, although much of it passed through and even remained inside 
the Transdniestrian territory.136 When violence broke out between Moldova 
and a growing separatist movement in Transdniestria, Transdniestrian paramili-
tary units were formed and professionally equipped with weaponry and sol-
diers from the Russian army.137 Hundreds of people were killed, and the appli-
cants were arrested and detained by men in Russian army uniforms.138 
                                                                                                                           
 131 See Ilaşcu and Others, App. No. 48787/99, ¶¶ 392–394. 
 132 See Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia, App. Nos. 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06, 
2012 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 106 (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-114082 
[http://perma.cc/BY6M-Y2YV] (determining Russia was responsible for Convention violations com-
mitted by a separatist regime that operated in Moldovan territory); Ilaşcu and Others, App. No. 
48787/99, ¶¶ 392, 394; Georgia v. Russia Amicus Curiae, supra note 113, at 3. 
 133 See Military Activities in Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J., ¶ 115; Ilaşcu and Others, App. No. 
48787/99, ¶ 392. 
 134 Ilaşcu and Others, App. No. 48787/99, ¶¶ 392–394. The court also held that Moldova, in addi-
tion to Russia, was responsible for the separatists’ actions because Moldova was the “only legitimate 
government” in the region of Transdniestria, and although Moldova may not have exercised exclusive 
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law to secure to the applicants the rights guaranteed by the Convention.” Id. ¶¶ 323, 330–331, 351–
352. 
 135 Id. ¶¶ 28–30. Neither Moldova nor the international community recognized Transdniestria as 
an independent state, and like Crimea in 2014, Transdniestria held a vote in 1991 that the sovereign 
state, Moldova, considered illegal and invalid. See id. ¶¶ 30, 47. 
 136 Id. ¶¶ 32, 34. 
 137 Id. ¶¶ 44–46, 380. 
 138 Id. ¶¶ 51, 188. The applicants also alleged that a Russian army commander called up Russian 
army reservists to be deployed in Transdniestria, reasoning “that Transdniestria is Russian territory 
and that the situation there has deteriorated, [and so] we must defend it by all means possible.” Id. 
¶ 46. 
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With facts strikingly similar to those in Ukraine v. Russia, the Ilaşcu court 
determined that Russia had decisive influence in Transdniestria and, through 
the conduct of the Transdniestrian separatists, had violated Article 3 of the 
Convention.139 The court determined that the Transdniestrian separatists had 
armed themselves with Russian weapons, the Russian military did not oppose 
the arming of the separatists, a large number of Russian nationals were fighting 
with the separatists, and a number of Russian troops were also fighting with 
the separatists.140 Consequently, the Transdniestrian regime was “at the very 
least under the decisive influence of the Russian Federation” and “survive[d] 
by virtue of the military, economic, financial and political support given to it 
by the Russian Federation.”141 Moreover, as a result of the “Russian authori-
ties’ collaboration” with the illegal separatist regime, they were “capable of 
engaging responsibility for the acts of that regime.”142 
To the extent that a state’s extraterritorial jurisdiction—through effective 
control or decisive influence—could vary depending on whether the conduct in 
question was that of a state actor or a non-state actor, the Ilaşcu court did not 
draw a clear distinction.143 Although the court determined that the Transdnies-
trian regime was comprised primarily of non-state actors—individuals not act-
ing on behalf of the Russian state—the court emphasized the significance of 
the Russian army’s participation in the regime.144 The court, however, did 
mark a clearer distinction in Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia, which 
was another individual application that arose out of the Transdniestrian con-
flict.145 There, the applicants complained of Moldovan school closings in the 
pro-Russian Transdniestria region where “there [was] no evidence of any di-
                                                                                                                           
 139 Id. ¶ 392; see November Press Release, supra note 6, at 1. 
 140 Ilaşcu and Others, App. No. 48787/99, ¶¶ 57, 60, 65. Although the evidence regarding how 
the separatists came into possession of the weapons was disputed, the court concluded that, beyond a 
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 141 Id. ¶ 392. 
 142 Id. ¶ 385. 
 143 See id. ¶ 384; Marko Milanovic, Grand Chamber Judgment in Catan and Others, EJIL: TALK! 
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 144 See Ilaşcu and Others, App. No. 48787/99, ¶¶ 384–385. The conduct ultimately imputed to 
Russia included the applicants’ arrest and detention by state actors—the Russian army—but also the 
applicants’ transfer to the Transdniestrian police and regime, which subsequently mistreated and vio-
lated the rights of the applicants. Id. 
 145 Catan and Others, App. Nos. 43370/04, 8252/05, and 18454/06, ¶¶ 12, 114, 122–123. 
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rect involvement of Russian agents in the action taken against the applicants’ 
schools.”146 Yet, in its holding, the ECtHR concluded that the conduct of the 
local regime in Transdniestria could be imputed to Russia because Russia nev-
ertheless exercised decisive influence over it and it continued to exist “only 
because of Russian military, economic and political support.”147 Consequently, 
Catan stands for the notion that the conduct of non-state actors can be imputed 
to a state when that state exercises decisive influence over the local govern-
ment.148 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Failure of the Interim Measures 
In granting Ukraine’s requested interim measures, the ECtHR used broad 
language “calling upon both Russia and Ukraine to refrain from taking any 
measures, in particular military action, which might bring about violations of 
the Convention rights of the civilian population, notably under Articles 2 and 3 
of the Convention.”149 Thus, in order to evaluate the efficacy of the order, the 
subsequent policies, armaments, and defenses of both Russia and Ukraine 
since the imposition of the interim measures must be considered.150 An evalua-
tion of Russia’s conduct in Crimea and eastern Ukraine after March 13, 2014 
reveals that Russia has violated the interim measures.151 This breach is evi-
denced by reports of significant human rights abuses, Russia’s effective control 
over Crimea, and, possibly, its decisive influence in eastern Ukraine.152 It is 
equally as evident from reports on the fighting that Ukraine—putting aside a 
counterargument for self-defense—is involved in military action and violating 
the letter of the interim measures too.153 Despite the flagrant violations of the 
interim measures, however, it is not necessarily accurate to say that the 
                                                                                                                           
 146 Id. ¶¶ 44–45, 114. Russia’s argument against Article 1 jurisdiction in this case was that, if the 
ECtHR were to impute the conduct of the non-state actors in Transdniestria, it would not be consonant 
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 147 See Military Activities in Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J., ¶ 115; Catan and Others, App. Nos. 
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ing that “[t]he fact that the local administration survives as a result of the Contracting State’s military 
and other support entails that State’s responsibility for its policies and actions.”). 
 149 November Press Release, supra note 6, at 2. 
 150 See March Press Release, supra note 6; November Press Release, supra note 6, at 1. 
 151 See SEPTEMBER REPORT, supra note 4, ¶¶ 3–4; November Press Release, supra note 6, at 2; 
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 152 See SEPTEMBER REPORT, supra note 4, ¶¶ 3–4; November Press Release, supra note 6, at 2; 
NATO Releases Satellite Imagery, supra note 54. 
 153 See SEPTEMBER REPORT, supra note 4, ¶ 3; November Press Release, supra note 6, at 2; UN 
Chief ‘Gravely Concerned,’ supra note 4. 
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measures will continue to be unsuccessful and ineffective as the international 
community works towards a resolution of this conflict.154 
1. Russia’s Conduct in Crimea 
With respect to the events that occurred in Crimea after March 13, 2014, 
Russia has definitively violated the court’s orders.155 Three days after Ukraine 
filed its application, the Crimean Parliament, which had already declared the 
peninsula to be part of Russia, held a public referendum to confirm its vote.156 
The months following the referendum saw Russia solidify its control over the 
area by formally annexing Crimea, nullifying all Ukrainian law on the penin-
sula, and implementing a full transition policy to integrate Crimea into Rus-
sia.157 In mid-April, Putin also admitted that Russian soldiers wearing un-
marked uniforms had been deployed throughout Crimea.158 
The annexation of Crimea, comprehensive transition process, and sub-
stantial presence of Russian troops mean that the day-to-day operations on the 
peninsula now are governed and effectively controlled by Russia.159 Under Ar-
ticle 1, and as a consequence of Russia’s effective control, Russia should be 
responsible for the human rights abuses occurring in Crimea—some of which 
                                                                                                                           
 154 See NAGENDRA SINGH, THE ROLE AND RECORD OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
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GUARDIAN (Mar. 13, 2014, 3:04 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/13/crimea-
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Ukraine, supra note 2. 
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Geneva Talks, PBS (Apr. 17, 2014, 11:45 AM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/putin-admits-
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 159 MAY REPORT, supra note 4, at 4; McMahon, supra note 157; see Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 115 (June 27) [here-
inafter Military Activities in Nicaragua] (defining the context in which a state could be liable for ac-
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are highlighted in a June 2014 report by the Office of the UN High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights (Office): 
[A] continuation of worrying trends, including instances of enforced 
disappearances, arbitrary detentions, violence and ill-treatment 
committed by the so-called “Crimean self-defence” [sic] . . . . Fur-
thermore the enforcement of the Russian Federation law on the terri-
tory of Crimea . . . is creating difficulties for Crimean residents to 
enjoy their human rights . . . .160 
Additionally, the UN report revealed specific breaches of Articles 2 and 3 
of the Convention, as it listed individuals who had been reported missing, im-
prisoned, or tortured by the Federal Security Service, the Russian security and 
counterintelligence agency.161 
Not only do these facts suffice to demonstrate effective control as re-
quired by Military Activities in Nicaragua, but they also align with Cyprus v. 
Turkey, in which Turkey’s effective control over Northern Cyprus gave rise to 
Turkish jurisdiction under Article 1 and state responsibility.162 Regardless of 
whether the international community recognizes Russia’s de facto control over 
Crimea as lawful, the human rights violations in Crimea still may be attributed 
to Russia.163 Consequently, Russia has failed to comply with the court’s inter-
im measures with respect to its conduct in Crimea.164 
                                                                                                                           
 160 JUNE REPORT, supra note 155, ¶ 284; see Convention, supra note 59, art. 1; Loizidou (Merits), 
App. No. 15318/89, ¶¶ 52, 56. 
 161 JUNE REPORT, supra note 155, ¶¶ 287–292; see Federal Security Service (FSB), ENCYC. BRI-
TANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/203373/Federal-Security-Service-FSB [http://
perma.cc/JWM9-GL7L] (last visited Jan. 28, 2016). Additional human rights violations recorded by 
the Office included the prohibition of groups from assembling (even those unrelated to the immediate 
political turmoil), the well-being and protection of gay and lesbian individuals (the de facto Crimean 
prime minister stressed these individuals would “not receive support from authorities”), and an in-
crease in domestic violence, because Russia—unlike Ukraine—has no explicit domestic violence law. 
SEPTEMBER REPORT, supra note 4, ¶¶ 159, 171–172. Additional reports noted that Crimeans who did 
not immediately apply for Russian citizenship were “facing harassment and intimidation”; restrictions 
or prohibitions were placed on Ukrainian television and radio outlets located in Crimea; and priests 
were experiencing attacks, pressure, and intimidation. MAY REPORT, supra note 4, at 28, 30. 
 162 See Military Activities in Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J., ¶ 115; Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 
25781/94, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 77 (2001), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
59454 [http://perma.cc/69RT-TXXG] [hereinafter Cyprus II]; MAY REPORT, supra note 4, at 4; 
McMahon, supra note 157. 
 163 See Tinoco Arbitration (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica), 1 R.I.A.A. 369, 381 (1923); Loizidou (Pre-
liminary Objections), App. No. 15318/89, ¶ 62. 
 164 See MAY REPORT, supra note 4, at 4; November Press Release, supra note 6, at 2; McMahon, 
supra note 157. 
186 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 39:163 
2. Russia’s Conduct in Eastern Ukraine 
Although Russia has exercised direct and effective control over Crimea 
since the March 13 interim measures, it has not demonstrated similar control 
over other areas in eastern Ukraine.165 Pro-Russian separatists may exercise 
some control over portions of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, but accounta-
bility for these separatists’ conduct cannot be automatically imputed to the 
Russian state.166 Yet, to the extent that Russia has exercised decisive influence 
in the region and on local governments, it may have jurisdiction under Article 
1; thus, it may be responsible for the fighters’ conduct—even though these are-
as remain part of Ukrainian territory.167 
Several reports from different international peace-keeping organizations 
proffer that Russian troops and weaponry have been sent to eastern Ukraine to 
support the separatists’ movement.168 Specifically, in August 2014, NATO re-
leased satellite images that appear to depict Russian troops within Ukraine.169 
A director in NATO’s Allied Command Operations described these images: 
Over the past two weeks we have noted a significant escalation in 
both the level and sophistication of Russia’s military interference in 
Ukraine . . . . The satellite images . . . provide additional evidence 
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that Russian combat soldiers, equipped with sophisticated heavy 
weaponry, are operating inside Ukraine’s sovereign territory . . . .170 
NATO also has reported significant amounts of advanced weapons sys-
tems, including artillery, tanks, and armored personnel carriers that have been 
transferred to separatist forces inside Ukraine.171 In November 2014, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, referring to border-crossing 
observations made by NATO, announced that “[f]orces, money, support, sup-
plies, [and] weapons are flowing back and forth across this border completely 
at will[.]”172 Additionally, the Organization of Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) observed vehicles believed to be carrying “Russian military 
men” across the border.173 Specifically, the vehicles were marked “Cargo 200,” 
which is a Russian military code for soldiers killed in action.174 NATO observ-
ers noted that this frequent Russian activity and movement was “part of a high-
ly coordinated and destabilising strategy.”175 
These observations are important because—with Loizidou, Ilaşcu, and 
Catan in mind—they suggest Russian control over the planning and day-to-
day operations in eastern Ukraine.176 Yet, it may be difficult to satisfy the 
higher standard relied on in Loizidou and to show conclusively that Russia is 
exhibiting sufficient “effective overall control” in eastern Ukraine.177 On the 
other hand, applying the ECtHR’s case law from both Ilaşcu and Catan, the 
money, support, supplies, and weapons allegedly “flowing back and forth 
across [the] border completely at will” may be sufficient to establish decisive 
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influence over the separatists’ conduct in eastern Ukraine.178 To the extent that 
the regimes in Donetsk and Luhansk survive and operate as a consequence of 
Russia’s financial, military, and political support—including Russia’s support 
for the November 2014 elections in the separatist Donetsk and Luhansk—the 
alleged Convention violations committed by the separatists in these areas 
could be imputed to Russia.179 
Finally, despite Russia’s repeated denial of its involvement in eastern 
Ukraine, such denial will not alone shield it from assuming responsibility for 
the conduct of the pro-Russian separatists.180 In sum, because Russia has en-
gaged in military action that has resulted in human rights violations contrary to 
the interim measures—through its effective control over Crimea and possibly 
its decisive influence over pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine—Russia 
has not abided by the interim measures.181 
3. Ukraine’s Conduct 
Although Ukraine requested interim measures to protect its nationals, 
when the court granted the request, it required that both Russia and Ukraine 
“refrain from taking any measures, in particular military action, which might 
bring about violations of the Convention . . . notably under Articles 2 and 
3[.]”182 Under a strict interpretation of the order, Ukraine has not abided by the 
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interim measures.183 Since the beginning of the conflict in Crimea and eastern 
Ukraine, Ukrainian security forces and army personnel have been the primary 
counter-force to pro-Russian separatists.184 Ukraine’s military action has con-
tributed to the deadly conflict, which, between April 2014 and December 2015, 
has claimed the lives of nearly 9000 people and left almost 21,000 wounded.185 
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights indicated that the 
civilian death toll was particularly high in the residential areas of eastern 
Ukraine, the control of which is contested by both the Ukrainian government 
and the pro-Russian separatists.186 Moreover, and pursuant to the ECtHR’s 
holding in Ilaşcu, to the extent that Ukraine is the “only legitimate govern-
ment” in eastern Ukraine, it will retain jurisdiction of the region under Article 
1, regardless of its ability to exercise effective control over the area.187 There-
fore, Ukraine will maintain its positive obligation in eastern Ukraine to “secure 
to the applicants the rights guaranteed by the Convention.”188 Although 
Ukraine may be forced to exercise its right to self-defense, its use of military 
action contributes to the serious and ongoing violation of its nationals’ human 
rights, contrary to the order of the ECtHR.189 
B. Contributions of the Interim Measures 
The court’s interim measures were not effective in restricting military ac-
tion by Russia or Ukraine, and as a consequence of the failure, Ukrainian na-
tionals have suffered ongoing human rights abuses and violations of their Con-
vention rights.190 It does not necessarily follow, however, that because the in-
terim measures were not initially effective, they will offer no value to a future 
resolution of the conflict.191 Regardless of when or how the conflict is fully 
resolved, its resolution is unlikely to arise from cloistered discussions between 
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Russia and Ukraine.192 Rather, any final resolution will likely be the product of 
complex negotiations between multiple states against a backdrop of interna-
tional institutions and trans-border alliances.193 Although international law ap-
pears weak in the context of effectuating the interim measures, the measures 
actually reinforce international law and, in conjunction with other international 
organizations—the UN, OSCE, NATO, World Trade Organization, Internation-
al Monetary Fund, and Group of Eight (G8)—they strengthen the efficacy and 
enforcement power of international law as a whole.194 
The interim measures demonstrate that the ECtHR can serve as yet anoth-
er platform for addressing and discussing international law and politics.195 By 
encouraging the use of a variety of different platforms, the international com-
munity has seen some success in mitigating the dangers in eastern Ukraine.196 
For example, the UN has deployed a Human Rights Monitoring Mission and 
holds regular meetings of the Security Council to address the human rights 
conditions and implications of the fighting.197 Additionally, the G8, the world’s 
eight wealthiest countries, voted to suspend Russia from the organization, cit-
ing Russia’s actions in Crimea as being inconsistent with the “shared beliefs” 
of the G8.198 The United States and EU have also implemented a number of 
stringent sanctions against Russia, including those that target high-level Rus-
sian officials and others that target Russian banks and corporations—
restricting credit markets for loans, energy technology exports, and arms pro-
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ducers.199 Whether or not sanctions are the best approach, they have—
particularly those imposed on large banks and other commercial businesses—
seriously impacted the overall economy of Russia.200 In cutting off virtually all 
sources of Western funding and financing, these sanctions have contributed to 
the worst currency crisis in Russia since 1998 and the recent downgrade of 
Russia’s credit rating to BBB-.201 
Moreover, the ceasefire originally brokered on February 12, 2015 be-
tween Ukraine, Russia, Germany, and France demonstrates that an effective 
truce is not the product of a single day’s work or a sheltered talk between two 
states.202 Instead, the satisfactory resolution of the conflict will result from a 
broad and expansive collection of international figures, organizations, and 
standards—even if any one of those could not, on its own, achieve the truce.203 
Dubbed the Minsk Agreement, the February 2015 truce aimed to implement an 
immediate ceasefire in Ukraine, to remove heavy weapons and artillery from 
the lines of fighting, and to set a deadline by which Ukraine is to regain full 
control over its eastern region, which was set for the end of 2015.204 These 
peace efforts, however, have been hampered by setbacks, including the crash 
of flight MH17 and the recent conclusion from Dutch officials that the cause of 
the crash was a surface-to-air missile that “could have commenced” from with-
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in eastern Ukraine.205 Additionally, the initial ceasefire that was called for by 
the Minsk Agreement was not maintained in the long-term, and fighting in-
stead continued throughout the year.206 As the deadline for complete Ukrainian 
control in Donetsk and Luhansk approached, both sides agreed to pull back 
their heavy weaponry from the primary areas of fighting.207 This agreement, 
reflecting the terms of the Minsk Agreement, and coupled with the general de-
cline in fighting on the front lines was said to possibly “signal the end of the 
war” in Ukraine.208 This deadline, however, came and went with Ukraine, Rus-
sia, France, and Germany agreeing to extend the terms of the Minsk Agree-
ment into 2016.209 
Ukraine’s application with the ECtHR has helped to enlarge the forum for 
discussion of international law, policy, security, and in particular, concerns re-
garding human rights challenges.210 The ECtHR application brings awareness 
of the human rights violations to other states and organizations.211 This aware-
ness is evidenced by the reporting and acknowledgment of the interim 
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measures in various media and government outlets.212 While the interim 
measures have not appeared in the mass media or been regularly addressed in 
the speeches of political leaders, the academic community has focused on and 
dissected the measures, analyzing their strengths and weaknesses through vig-
orous debate.213 
Finally, by filing an application with the ECtHR and requesting interim 
measures, Ukraine has opted—on the international stage—to take the high 
road by seeking to achieve order through international legal obligations and 
principled solutions.214 Possible effects of such conduct are reflected in United 
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, where the United States 
sought the assistance and support of the ICJ even though it was unlikely that 
the proceeding alone would result in the release of the hostages.215 Its appeal to 
an international tribunal demonstrated to the world that the United States had 
been wronged, that it would not use force in response, and that Iran had violat-
ed principles of international law.216 Consequently, the institution of the ICJ 
proceeding strengthened the U.S. position by highlighting Iran’s illegal con-
duct in a juridical setting and helped diversify the forums in which states ad-
dress international law and order.217 The same is true of Ukraine’s application 
to the ECtHR—particularly when combined with appeals to and monitoring by 
the UN, economic sanctions imposed by the international community, and, 
perhaps most important, the Minsk Agreement, which, although requiring 
months to take hold, may finally be working to resolve the conflict.218 
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CONCLUSION 
Although Russia and Ukraine violated the interim measures by continuing 
to fight and effect human rights violations, Ukraine’s inter-state application to 
the ECtHR nevertheless can be a tool to help resolve the conflict. The efficacy 
and execution of the court’s interim measures have frequently been questioned, 
but the unique nature and rarity of an inter-state application provides the court 
with a way to contribute to the resolution of the conflict on an international 
stage. Alone, the interim measures are not sufficient to put an end to the 
fighting and human rights challenges, but they certainly contribute to the dis-
course on international law, rights, obligations, and relations. It is with the help 
of these forums that a permanent solution will eventually be reached in 
Ukraine. 
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